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“The larger and more colorful a city is, the more places there are to hide one’s
guilt and sin; the more crowded it is, the more people there are to hide behind.
A city’s intellect ought to be measured not by its scholars, libraries, miniaturists,
calligraphers and schools, but by the number of crimes insidiously committed on
its dark streets...” Orhan Pamuk, My name is Red, p.123.
1 Introduction
One of the most puzzling elements of crime is its heterogeneity across space and not its level
or inter-temporal differences (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996; Sampson, Rau-
denbush, and Earls, 1997).1 Even after controlling for economic and social conditions and
population characteristics, there remains a high variance of crime across space. Homicide
rates across comparable and more or less equally developed nations in the European Union
(EU-15) in the 1990s range from on average 12 cases of homicide per million inhabitants in
Sweden, to 28 homicides per million in Finland. Within a sample of Dutch municipalities
(>30,000 inhabitants) crime rates per capita vary between 1.60 in Hof Van Twente (Overijs-
sel) and 14.60 per capita in Amsterdam. Observable factors, such as population density, the
youth unemployment rate, the mean level of education and income inequality can account
for only a small fraction in explaining these differences.2 For example, Utrecht has a crime
rate per capita of 14.3 compared to Leiden with worse observables, which has a crime rate
of only 6.3 per capita.
How can we explain these differences in crime rates across space? We argue that dif-
ferences in social capital can account for a significant part of the observed differences in
crime rates across cities. Criminal behaviour depends not only on the incentives facing the
individual but also on the behaviour of peers or others surrounding the individual. In case
of the same opportunity and expected returns from crime, an individual is less likely to
commit crime if his peers and the community he belongs to punish deviant behaviour. If one
individual decides not to commit crime, it is less likely that others will do so, which creates
an external effect of one person’s behaviour on the others. Informal social control by which
citizens themselves achieve social order increases the level of well-being in a community.
1See Freeman (1999) for an overview of the crime literature in economics. Early contributions in economics
by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) explain the level of crime and the decision to commit crime from an
economic perspective.
2Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) argue that only about 30 percent of the variance in crime
rates across space in the United States can be explained by observable differences in local area characteristics.
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This in turn raises the level of trust among citizens, altruistic behaviour (e.g., involvement
in charity and voluntary contributions or donations) and participation in activities that serve
the community at a more abstract level (e.g., voting). Although informal social control is
often a response to unusual behaviour, it is not the same as formal regulation and it should
not be equated with formal institutions that are designed to prevent and punish crime, such
as the police and courts. It rather refers to the ability of groups to realise collective goals
and, in our setting, to live in places free of crime.
The empirical part of this research focuses on municipalities (>30,000 inhabitants) in the
Netherlands. We employ a variety of social capital measures. Previous work in economics
and sociology treats social capital as a positive sum.3 Instead of measuring social capital
as a positive value, it might be easier to measure the absence of social capital through tra-
ditional measures of social dysfunction such as, family break down, migration and erosion
in intermediate social structures (Fukuyama, 1996). This approach hinges on the assump-
tion that just as involvement in civic life is associated with higher levels of social capital,
social deviance reflects lower levels of social capital. We benefit from different indicators
such as voluntary contributions to charity, electoral turnout and blood donations as well as
traditional measures of social capital. 4
These indicators seem unrelated and plagued by measurement error if used as individual
indicators of social capital. However, they turn out to be highly correlated and a common
denominator of all these indicators combining several multifaceted dimensions may serve
as a useful and a robust measure of social capital (e.g., Table 2 and Figure 1 below). We
first tackle this problem by treating social capital as a latent construct and form several
social capital indices by using principal component analysis (PCA). Second, we show that
social capital, both represented by individual indicators and by an index, is an important
determinant of crime after controlling for other covariates. We also show that the historical
state of a municipality in terms of population heterogeneity, religiosity and education has an
impact on the formation of current social capital. Our findings reveal that on average a one
standard deviation increase in social capital would reduce crime rates by 0.32 of a standard
3Higher social capital is associated with higher economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997); more in-
vestment in human capital (e.g., Coleman, 1988); higher levels of financial development (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2004); more innovation (e.g., Akc¸omak and ter Weel, 2006) and lower homicide rates (e.g.,
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001).
4Various indicators have been employed to proxy social capital, e.g., generalized trust and membership
to associations, gathered from different surveys like the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European
Social Survey (ESS). Although these indicators result in consistent and robust findings, their use has received
criticism due to inherent measurement error.
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deviation and that social capital explains about 9 percent of the total variation in crime
rates.
Our approach contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we treat social capi-
tal as a latent construct and we measure both the presence (e.g., blood donations, voluntary
giving and trust) and absence of social capital (e.g., family breakdown and population het-
erogeneity), which differentiates our study from the existing literature. Simple correlations
between various survey and non-survey indicators of social capital display quite high coeffi-
cients. For instance, the average of the correlation coefficients between survey based trust
and non-survey based social capital indicators − charity, blood and vote − is roughly 0.40.
Second, we try to provide an explanation for how social capital forms. This aspect is largely
ignored in the literature and only took attention recently. In line with Tabellini (2005) and
Akc¸omak and ter Weel (2006) we argue that the history of a municipality a century ago
does have a significant impact on current levels of social capital. Third, though crime is a
global phenomenon most of the literature is based on the evidence from the United States
(US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada.5 The Netherlands has an interesting setting
with homogeneous economic conditions, high concentration of foreigners and a free market
for soft drugs. Finally, our units (municipalities) are much smaller in scale and much more
homogeneous when compared to other studies. So, the results are less likely to be affected
from differences in government policies, laws and regulations. Given the high level of homo-
geneity, the probability of finding a significant correlation between social capital and crime
is low, making us confident of the robustness of our estimates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and develops
our arguments. We present information on the data in Section 3. The empirical strategy is
presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimates and a number of robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
Our conceptual framework to study the link between social capital and crime to explain
the heterogeneity of crime through space is based on social capital as a source of control
and community organization. To explain this concept we first explain how we define social
5For US see for instance, Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Freeman (1996),Grogger (1998),
Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002), Levitt (2004) and Lochner and Moretti
(2004). For UK see, Wolpin (1978) and Sampson and Groves (1989) and for Canada see, Macmillan (1995)
and McCarthy and Hagan (2001).
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capital. After that we develop our conceptual framework and the approach taken to explore
the link between social capital and crime.
2.1 Defining social capital
Our definition of social capital is based on four different measures from several different
literatures.
First, social capital is an increasing function of participation in civic life. For instance,
higher voter turnout and more voluntary donations to charity contribute to a community’s
social capital. Voter turnout is hypothesized to capture civic involvement and participation
in community decision making. This indicator is also used by Putnam (1993, 1995), Rosen-
feld, Messner, and Baumer (2001) and Gatti, Tremblay, and Larocque (2003). Voluntary
contributions in money terms are supposed to capture the strength of intermediate social
structures such as charities, clubs and churches and could be employed as another indicator
that measures the presence of social capital. We use a city’s voter turnout rate and its
monetary contribution per household to charity as indicators for social capital.
Second, social capital is higher when people care more for each other or are more altruistic.
To measure this dimension of social capital, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) suggest
to use voluntary blood donations as an indicator for social capital. Although charity and
blood seems to measure similar phenomena there is one particular difference. Experimental
research reports that voluntary contributions may incorporate elements of warm glow (e.g.,
Andreoni, 1995) and reciprocity at the same time. For instance, most charity organizations
send or give small gifts (pens, postcards, etc.) and it has been shown that the contributions
increase with the size of the gift (Falk, 2004). However monetary compensations for donating
blood may even crowd out blood donation as suggested by Titmuss (1970) and recent studies
have shown that this could well be the case (e.g., Mellstrom and Johannesson, forthcoming).
In the Netherlands there is no monetary compensation of any kind for donating blood, so
we suggest that blood donation captures a pure warm glow effect. We use voluntary blood
donations per capita as a measure of social capital.
Third, security and trust increase the stock of social capital. When there is more con-
formist behaviour, more respect for each other and when norms are institutionalized, the
level of social capital is higher. Trust has been identified as a source of social capital.
Economists defined the concept in a rather lax way, as an optimistic expectation regarding
other agents behaviour (Fafchamps, 2004). Both sociologists and economists have benefited
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from the survey-based ‘generalized trust’ indicator as a proxy to social capital, which mea-
sures the degree of opportunistic behaviour and as an alternative indicator to social relations
in general (e.g., Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Rosenfeld,
Messner, and Baumer, 2001; Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2004). The trust indicator is
found to be highly correlated with other measures of social capital such as memberships to
associations, extent of friendship and neighbourhood networks and voting (Putnam, 1995).6
We use a generalized trust index and trust in the police as indicators for social capital.
Finally, informal controls and the extent of informal contacts and acquaintances in-
crease social capital. So far our indicators assume to measure the presence of social capital.
However, the absence of social capital can be measured by using measures of population
heterogeneity and family structure. First, the literature on disadvantaged youth and juve-
nile crime suggests that most criminals come from single-parent households (e.g., Case and
Katz, 1991). Social capital in single-parent households is supposed to be low because of
the fact that they lack a second parent and because they change residence frequently. It
has been shown that single-parenthood has a negative impact on various outcomes, such
as educational attainment, juvenile crime and teenage pregnancy, affecting children’s social
development (e.g., McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; Parcel and Menaghan, 1994). Second,
population heterogeneity is an important factor that affects social capital and trust as it
breaks closure. We use divorce rates and the percentage of foreigners as indicators of (lack
of) informal control and population heterogeneity.
Empirically, we view social capital as a latent construct that consists of these elements.
In Section 3 the empirical methodology is described in great detail.
2.2 Social control and community organization
Studies of the social environmental characteristics of crime have shown that there exists
a lot of heterogeneity. Disadvantaged neighbourhoods and communities are not equally
plagued by high crime rates. Sampson and Groves (1988) have developed a theory of social
organization in which communities are empowered through their trust in each other to take
action against crime and to join with formal control, such as the police.7 Consistent with this
theory, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) report significantly lower crime levels and
self-reports of victimization in neighbourhoods characterized by social or collective efficacy
6Research has shown that the survey-based trust question may measure trustworthiness (Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000)) or well-functioning institutions (Beugelsdijk (2005)) rather than trust itself.
7See also Kornhauser (1978), Sampson and Groves (1989) and Bursik and Grasmick (1993).
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in their study of informal social organization and violent crime in Chicago. Similarly, Bursik
and Grasmick (1993) argue that the effectiveness of law enforcement and public control is
higher in communities with extensive civic engagement.8 Strong attachment and involvement
in community matters also leads to strong social bonds by which conflicts are resolved in a
more peaceful way compared to communities with weak social bonds (e.g., Hirschi, 1969).
Hence, the cost of conflict resolution decreases and more conflicts will be solved.
Communities are stronger when there is lower population turnover and density, because
turnover and density negatively affect the ability to know others and to observe and intervene
in trouble making activities. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) explain why there is more crime
in larger cities, and find that larger communities have a more transient and anonymous
character, which reduces social cohesion. This makes it harder to enforce social sanctions,
which reduces the cost of crime and in the end results in more crime. Similarly, Williams and
Sickles (2002) find that by being caught an individual risks to loose the utility generating
social capital (loss of reputation and job, divorce etc.). This means that the more social
capital an individual possesses the higher the expected cost of committing crime, which
reduces the probability to engage in criminal activities. So, given the probability of being
caught and formal control, higher levels of social capital seem to reduce crime.
When people know each other better, they are also more likely to participate in com-
munity organizational life. This is expressed in participation in voluntary organizations and
charity (e.g., Putnam, 1993) and support. The opposite is true for disadvantaged families
and disadvantaged neighbourhoods in which deprivation of any kind feeds further depri-
vation through mechanisms of social interactions and peer effects such as learning effects,
imitation and taking the peers as a role model (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; Manski, 2000;
Evans, Wallace, and Schwab, 1992). Individuals who belong to these families are more likely
to be unemployed, have low incomes and education and have personal problems. In most
cases divorce rates are higher and families are single-parent families headed by women. They
are also more likely to live in dense areas with a heterogeneous population and more likely
to change residence. Hence, disadvantaged families and persons invest and participate less
in the social community they belong to.
8See e.g., Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower (1984), Sampson and Groves (1989), Land, McCall, and Cohen
(1990), Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (2001), Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez (2002) and Messner,
Baumer, and Rosenfeld (2004) for empirical evidence.
6
2.3 Operating the concept
An important issue is that most research on social capital struggles with causality. In this
research, it could be the case that higher crime rates result in out-migration and constrain
positive social interactions. It might also be the case that criminal activity erodes social cap-
ital because it engages individuals in crime networks and keeps them away from educational
and occupational opportunities. We argue that social capital is a positive sum and founded
by historical institutions. Institutions promoting the formation of social capital in the past
are positively correlated with current levels of social capital. Finally, higher levels of social
capital now, result in lower crime rates.
We apply an instrumental variable strategy in which we instrument a city’s current social
capital with its past level education, population heterogeneity and religiosity. Recent studies
have shown the validity of such an approach (Tabellini, 2005; Akc¸omak and ter Weel, 2006).
We argue that population heterogeneity, the contribution of religiosity to human and social
capital investments, and education in the past contribute to the formation of a city’s social
capital, hence shape current social capital.
If social capital is an asset paving the way to community governance (Bowles and Gintis,
2002) or to achieve goals that could be not be achieved or could be achieved only at an higher
cost (Coleman, 1988), then any factor that would lead to disorganization and dis-attachment
in the community would eventually reduce social capital. Population heterogeneity is such a
factor that may trigger dis-attachment as higher levels of heterogeneity would break closure,
reduce acquaintance among residents and may result in lower trust among members of the
community (e.g., Rose and Clear, 1998; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001). The effects
of racial and/or ethnic heterogeneity on socio-economic outcomes are well documented in
the literature. It is shown that heterogeneity has an effect on corruption (Mauro, 1995), rent
seeking and low educational attainment (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and lower provision
of public goods (Goldin and Katz, 1999). However, our argument in this paper is that
ethnic and religious heterogeneity may result in circumstances where formal and/or informal
institutions are not binding. Therefore, our argument is more in line with the literature
that links heterogeneity to social capital in the wider sense. For instance, both Easterly
and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) argue that ethnic fragmentation
may increase polarization in a community and create difficulty in the provision of public
goods such as public education, libraries, and sewer systems. In a similar vein Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000) argue that racial composition affects the degree in participation in social
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activities. Zak and Knack (2001) and Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2002) also show
that higher levels of ethnic diversity may result in less trusting societies.
We argue that Protestant belief may have a dual effect on the formation of social capital,
which is beyond simply saying that being more religious is associated with higher social
capital. First, Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) differentiate between bonding and bridging social
capital and argue that groups characterized by bonding social capital are not effective in
creating an environment of informal social control to deal with the threat of crime, whereas
groups with extensive bridging social capital are more effective in creating such foundations.9
The results show that crime rates are lower in societies with higher levels of bridging social
capital. Given this finding that mainline Protestants are more likely to be involved in
community wide volunteering, which in turn refers to higher levels of social capital, we argue
that communities where more Protestants reside are characterized by a certain environment
and ‘ethic’ to paraphrase Max Weber, in which social capital may nurture. This view stresses
the institutional aspect of Protestantism. A second link is the human capital aspect (Becker
and Woessmann, 2007). The argument here is that Protestant instructions to read the Bible
in ones own language and the support for universal schooling boosted the literacy levels early
on and hence created human capital as a side effect. Previous research by Coleman (1988)
and Goldin and Katz (1999) helps to explain differences in human capital by relating it to
historical differences in social capital. 10
The interaction between human and social capital is well documented in the literature
(e.g., Coleman, 1988; Goldin and Katz, 1999). Here we base our argument on the fact that
human capital affects social capital with a lag. For instance Goldin and Katz (1999) show
that high school movement in the 1930s in various states in the U.S affects current levels of
social capital. Recent analyses by Tabellini (2005) and Akc¸omak and ter Weel (2006) support
this finding. They show that for different samples of European regions literacy rates in 1880s
do have an impact on current levels of social capital and on a set of cultural indicators. The
idea here is that education builds human and social capital at the same time. As shown
9Bonding social capital are links mainly or exclusively among members of the same group, whereas bridg-
ing social capital links members of different groups among communities. Bonding social capital increases
community social capital within groups, but may also reduce overall social capital by restricting links among
groups. Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) use the percentage of mainline Protestant and Catholics as a proxy for
bridging social capital as they involve in community wide volunteering, and the percentage of Evangelical
Protestants as a proxy for bonding social capital because Evangelical Protestants are more likely to involve
in voluntary activities within their group but not in a wider community.
10A possible third mechanism may be the ‘guilt’ mechanism. As suggested by Fafchamps (1996) and
Platteau (1994), contractual obligations could be enforced via several mechanisms such as loss of reputation
and guilt. Starting from Max Weber numerous studies emphasized how religion might play a role in individual
or firm decision making.
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by Gradstein and Justman (2000, 2002) education affects social capital because education is
an important socializing instrument as it builds common norms and facilitates interaction
between community members who might be different along cultural, religious or ethnic lines.
3 Data and Descriptives
The data span 142 municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in the Netherlands.
We employ the 2002 geographical definition of Dutch municipalities with each municipality
matched to a NUTS regional definition too.11 Most of the socio-economic variables come from
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). We restrict our analysis to municipalities with populations
of more than 30,000. For smaller municipalities and for earlier years some variables are
unavailable. Table 1 presents summary statistics for all variables we use in the empirical
analysis. We discuss the most salient details of the most important variables below, and
other variable definitions, sources and details in Appendix 1.
3.1 Social capital
We benefit from several indicators to proxy social capital. Information on voluntary giving,
charity, is obtained from the national fundraising agency (Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving,
CBF). The original data is available in euro terms and defined as voluntary contributions per
household averaged over the term 2000-2005.12 For the electoral turnout we use the voter
turnout for the elections of the Lower House (Tweede Kamer) in 2003. Following Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) we collected data on blood donations. The data set is for
2005 and comprises information on the number of donations. We define blood as the blood
donations per 100 inhabitants. Higher values of charity, vote and blood are associated with
higher levels of social capital.
To support our data and for robustness purposes we have also gathered data from ESS −
a database designed to measure persistence and change in people’s social and demographic
characteristics, attitudes and values. These survey-based indicators are widely used in the
11The 2002 geographical definition of Dutch municipalities is available at Statistics Netherlands (CBS),
http://www.cbs.nl. The NUTS definition is available at eurostat http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. The Nether-
lands are divided into 4 NUTS 1, 12 NUTS 2 and 40 NUTS 3 regions. See Appendix 4 for details.
12We also calculated voluntary givings per inhabitant for each year and then averaged the data over time
to see whether there is any significant difference between the two measures. As expected there is no effect
on the results. This calculation introduces some bias because the municipality definitions change every year
from 2000 to 2005 and for this reason we use correspondence tables to match municipalities and in cases that
we have missing population or household information we interpolate the data. Due to these shortcomings we
use the original version of the indicator as available from the source.
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social capital literature. To increase the sample size we merged the first and the second
round of ESS conducted in 2002 and 2004. The merged data include information on more
than 4,000 individuals. The data is adjusted by population weights to reduce the possibility
of complications that might arise due to over-sampling. We construct an equal weight trust
indicator from the answers to the following three questions and label it trust, (i) ppltrust is
formed from the answers to the following statement: “Most people can be trusted or you can’t
be too careful”, (ii) most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair (fair), (iii)
most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves (help). For all three
indicators higher values represent higher levels of social capital. To capture the confidence
in institutions we use “trust in police” (formed from the question “How much you personally
trust the police”) from the same source. Unfortunately all these five indicators are only
available for 40 NUTS 3 regions and it is not possible to collect similar information at the
municipality level. However, we include these measures in our analysis by creating variables
that have the same value for municipalities in the same NUTS 3 regional definition.13
We also measure the absence of social capital using traditional measures of heterogeneity
and family structure. We first collected information on the percentage of foreigners in each
municipality as a proxy to population heterogeneity.14 Related to this measure we formed
movers to represent mobility in a municipality. We define movers as the sum of the absolute
value of immigration and emigration divided by the population. To capture erosion in family
induced social capital divorce rates are used as an indicator.15
The correlations among all these indicators are displayed in Table 2 and depicted in
Figure 1. The simple correlations suggest that measures of social capital are strongly cor-
related. Correlations between the individual indicators, charity, blood, vote, trust, foreign
and divorce, are in a range between 0.01 to -0.74 with an average of 0.36.16 As shown in
Appendices 2 to 5 these observations are not restricted to a specific group of municipalities
and hold for different subsamples.17
13For instance, Heerlen (917), Sittard (1883), Maastricht (935), Landgraaf (882) and Kerkrade (928) are
all in Zuid-Limburg, hence all five municipalities share the same value for the above indicators from the ESS
database.
14To support this measure we also collected data on immigration, emigration and detailed data on foreigners
differentiating between males and females and between first and second generation immigrants. Introducing
such differences does not yield different results.
15We also experimented with using the percentage of single parent families/households, which yields similar
results.
16The average calculated by taking the absolute value of each correlation. For NUTS 3 regions the corre-
lations range from 0.19 to -0.86, with an average of 0.46.
17We have replicated the analysis for municipalities with more than 40,000 and 50,000 inhabitants respec-
tively, for 40 NUTS 3 regions and for 22 largest agglomeration in the Netherlands.
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To get an idea of how regions and municipalities are distributed along these social capital
indicators we ran a k-means cluster analysis to see whether the data differentiates between
regions with high and low social capital. If the analysis is restricted to two groups there is a
clear distinction between the north and east of the Netherlands, which are rich in terms of
social capital and the south and the west, which are relatively poor in terms of social capital.
If the cluster groups are increased to 4 this distinction still prevails although it is not that
clear anymore. Municipalities in the northern part of the Netherlands tend to have values
that are above the mean for charity, blood, vote and trust and values below mean for foreign
and divorce. In the southern part this pattern is the other way around. In the west and
the east we have mixed groups. This simple preliminary analysis gives another hint that the
social capital indicators tend to move together supporting simple correlations.
Our fundamental premise in this paper is that these variables capture different dimensions
of social capital and even though they may not be very good proxies for social capital
individually, a common denominator of them may stand as a good indicator of social capital.
The final goal is to treat social capital as a latent construct and to form social capital indices
by using principal component analysis (PCA). First, we performed PCA including charity,
blood, vote, trust, foreign and divorce and saved the first principal component as SC1 which
explains about 55 percent of the total variation. This is an overall index merging both
presence and absence of social capital in one measure. Then we formed another index in a
similar way, SC2, only capturing the presence of social capital hence including the first four
indicators above. Due to reasons we have mentioned above about the availability of trust at
the municipality level, we formed a final index, SC3, including only charity, blood and vote
for robustness reasons. The first component explains more than 60 percent of the variation in
these three variables. Further details on the social capital indicators, the principal component
loadings and the explained variance for all included indicators are presented in Appendix
1.2.
3.2 Crime
Information about crime is constructed from the 2002 crime monitor of the Algemeen Dag-
blad. The data yield information on 27 different types of crime.
We form an overall indicator per 100 inhabitants covering all recorded crimes and label
it crime. In the literature there is a tendency to use data for crime that have minimal
reporting inconsistencies such as, motor vehicle theft, robbery and burglary. This is indeed
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important because the crime numbers include a category for bicycle theft, but especially in
the Netherlands bicycle theft is so common that many people do not even report if they
are victim of bicycle theft. In a similar vein, crime numbers on handling soft drugs could
also be biased since there is a relative free market for soft drugs in the Netherlands. On
the other hand, citizens are more likely to report if their car is stolen. Therefore, as well as
analyzing overall crime rates we have specified nine categories of crime according to the 2006
European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice. These are homicide, serious assaults,
rape, robbery, theft, motor vehicle theft, burglary, domestic burglary and drug related crimes.
Appendix 1.3 defines each of these categories and presents descriptive statistics for a number
of subsamples. The most important categories of reported crime for our preferred sample
of cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants are robberies and drug related crime. Least
important are burglary and rape.
A more detailed investigation of the crime data produces two main insights. First, most
recorded crime falls into one or two subcategories. For example, overall theft is roughly 55
percent of all recorded crime and roughly 11 percent consists of assaults; whereas serious
crime such as rape and homicide is only 1 percent of overall crime rate. Second, in the
Netherlands most criminal activities take place in larger agglomerations. For instance, among
all recorded homicides 51 percent occurred in the 22 largest cities and about 85 percent were
observed in municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. In extreme cases like robbery
and drug related crime 3 out of 4 attempts are observed in the 22 largest Dutch cities. This
pattern more or less prevails for all categories and even for overall crime rates as 53 percent
of all recorded crime is observed in the 22 largest agglomerations and 83 percent occurs
in municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants Table A1.3.2 provides the distribution
of criminal activities for different subsamples. It seems appropriate to argue that criminal
activity in the Netherlands is an urban phenomenon, which supports our choice of sample.
The selection of 142 municipalities represents only about 35 percent of all the municipalities
in the Netherlands but covers over 90 percent of overall crime.
3.3 Instrumental variables
In line with Tabellini (2005) and Akc¸omak and ter Weel (2006) we suggest that historical
factors do have an impact on the formation of social capital and rely on three indicators as
an instrument for social capital all of which are observed at the municipality level in 1859:
(i) population heterogeneity, (ii) percentage of protestants, (iii) number of schools. All three
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variables are taken from the population archive (Volkstellingen), which provides historical
data on household, population, occupation etc. starting from 1795 onwards. We selected
1859 because this is the earliest date for which data at the municipality level are available.
More information about the population archive and the three instruments can be found in
Appendix 1.4. Table A1.4 lists the data for the 142 municipalities with more than 30,000
inhabitants.
The percentage of foreigners in 1859 is used as an instrument for current social capital
as it is a proxy for trust in 1859. Municipalities that were well endowed in terms of social
capital 150 years ago may still be rich in social capital, which emphasizes the importance
of initial presence. In this case, past social capital directly affects current social capital but
has no direct impact on current crime levels. We define foreign1859 as the percentage of
foreigners living in a municipality in 1859. We define protestant1859 as the percentage of
inhabitants belonging to any of the Protestant denominations in 1859. We also collected
data on the number of schools in 1859 in each municipality as a direct proxy for human
capital investment different from the effect of Protestantism on human capital formation as
discussed in Section 2. Although it may not be a perfect indicator for human capital in
1859 we believe that it is still a credible instrument to current social capital. #school1859
is defined as number of schools per 1,000 inhabitants.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy hinges on the assertion that social capital is an important determinant
of crime and that social capital is hard to measure and thus should be best treated as a latent
construct. Social capital is different from other forms of capital in the sense that it is not
directly observable. Therefore, our first strategy is to measure social capital as a single
index composed of different indicators that could act as an individual proxy for different
dimensions of social capital. To do so, we use a principal component analysis (PCA) that
estimates
Yi = βisocial capital+ i, (1)
where i corresponds to different indicators of social capital, Y is the latent construct com-
posed of a number of social capital indicators. Estimating this equation yields a number of
principal component factors and a number of principal component loadings, βi, which could
be viewed as weights. Since the indicators are highly correlated with each other we only
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use the first principal component as a measure of social capital and label it SCx, where
x ranges from 1 to 3 and denotes the inclusiveness of the index. As discussed above we
construct three indices where SC1 is the most inclusive consisting of six indicators and SC3
is the least inclusive consisting of three indicators. Table A1.2 lists the principal component
loadings and the explained variance for each index and for each sample. The first principal
component explains 50 to 65 percent of the variation induced by the indicators.18
Having constructed the indices of social capital we start estimating the following base
model with OLS using usual explanatory variables of crime:
crime = β0 + β1density+ β2education+ β3unemp
+ β4young+ β5SC+ , (2)
where subscriptm for municipalities has been suppressed for notational convenience, and the
error term complies with the usual assumptions. Crime represents crime rates depending on
the type or group of criminal activity. Density refers to population density. To normalize
the data we took the natural log of population density. We expect higher crime rates in
densely populated areas. Education is the percentage of people with medium and high levels
of education. As criminal activity is concentrated within relatively younger age groups,
we have included the percentage of people between 15-24 years old. Unemp represents the
unemployed under age 30. We expect education to be negatively correlated with crime
and the percentage of population 15-24 years old and youth unemployment to be positively
associated with crime. SC represents not only the three indices but also the six individual
indicators to construct the indices.
The next step is to replicate the analysis above for an extended model:
crime = β0 + β1density+ β2education+ β3unemp
+ β4young+ β5SC+ β6X + υ, (3)
where X consists of a set of control variables which are; (i) income inequality, (i) controls
for the percentage of area devoted to shopping and recreation activities, and (iii) number
of coffeeshops per 10,000 inhabitants. We expect these variables to be positively correlated
with crime rates.
18Recently, a similar strategy was used by Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, and Murphy (2005) to measure the impact
of crack cocaine on crime in U.S. cities.
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Endogeneity and the possibility of reverse causality could bias the estimates of the above
models when using OLS. Putnam (2000) has argued that low social capital may result in
higher crime, which in turn may result in even lower levels of social capital. For example,
a third unobserved variable could affect both crime and social capital. Certain policies
implemented by the local government could reduce crime but at the same time have an
impact on social capital. Or, it could be the case that crime reporting rates are correlated
with social capital levels, so inhabitants living in high social capital areas may be more likely
to report crime (e.g., Soares, 2004). To deal with such problems we use a 2SLS strategy in
which we instrument social capital with the historical proxies discussed and constructed in
Section 3. We use the percentage of foreigners, protestants and the number of schools in
1859 as instruments for social capital. This yields the following model for estimation:
crime = β0 + β1density+ β2education+ β3unemp
+ β4young+ β5SC+ β6X + ν,
SC = δ0 + δ1foreign1859+ δ2protestant1859
+ δ3#school1859+ δ4Z + η, (4)
where foreign1859 stands for the percentage of foreigners and protestant1859 denotes the
percentage of Protestants living in a municipality in 1859. #school1859 is the number of
schools per 100 inhabitants in 1859. The matrix Z includes all other exogenous variables. We
expect foreign1859 to be negatively, and protestant1859 and #school1859 to be positively
correlated with social capital. Since almost all our variables have different measurement
levels we standardized all the variables so that the mean and variance equals 0 and 1,
respectively. Therefore the estimated coefficients are also standardized coefficients measuring
how the dependent variable responds when an independent variable changes by one standard
deviation.
5 Results
5.1 OLS Estimates
We start by estimating the base model (equation 2) using OLS. Table 3 presents the esti-
mates. The dependent variable is defined as the overall crime rates. The mean of this crime
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measure has been standardized to zero. We observe from the base model that individual
indicators of social capital have s significant impact on overall crime rates. Charity, blood,
vote, trust and trustplc are negatively associated with crime, whereas foreign, divorce and
movers are positively correlated with crime rates. With the exception of trust all coefficients
are significant at the 5 percent level.19 Our findings are in line with the previous research
that reports negative effects for trust, civicness and electoral turnout (e.g., Sampson and
Groves, 1989; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001; Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez,
2002; Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2004) and research that finds a positive link between
crime and population heterogeneity (e.g., Jobes, 1999) and single parenthood (e.g., Samp-
son, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999) and crime. Moreover, all three social capital indices have
significant negative effects on crime as can be observed from the last three columns in Table
3. These indices imply that a one standard deviation increase in the social capital index
reduces crime by between 0.29 and 0.35 of a standard deviation. This effect is economically
meaningful, since it means that a one standard deviation increase in social capital would
reduce crime rates by about 2 percent on average.
Our findings on ordinary determinants of crime also support prior evidence. Population
density generally has a positive and significant effect on crime suggesting that densely popu-
lated areas are more likely to be vulnerable to crime than relatively rural areas (e.g., Wolpin,
1978; Macmillan, 1995). This results because heterogeneity and residential instability reduce
the effectiveness of community sanctions. In addition, urban areas attract criminal activ-
ity as there are more opportunities for such activities in cities where they can act rather
anonymously (e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). We find a negative coefficient for edu-
cation suggesting that the higher the level of education the lower the crime rate, which is
also consistent with the literature (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Wolpin, 1978). This is first
because higher education is associated with better labor-market outcomes hence increasing
the opportunity cost of crime and possibly because school attendance keeps young people
away from the street conditional on the fact that young people commit more crimes (Lochner
and Moretti, 2004). However, only in a few specifications the coefficient is statistically sig-
nificant. The results also show that crime rates are increasing with the percentage of young
people, which is consistent with earlier work (Wolpin, 1978; Freeman, 1996; Grogger, 1998).
The only contradicting result of our estimates is the negative coefficient for the youth unem-
19As we have mentioned before trust scores are available at the NUTS 3 level and are merged to data at
the municipality level. This adjustment likely partly explains why the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Similar analysis at the NUTS 3 level (with n = 40) returns a significant coefficient for trust.
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ployment rate, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Oster and Agell (2007)
and Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) show for a panel of Swedish municipalities and
American cities that a fall in unemployment led to a drastic decrease in drug possession, auto
theft and burglary. However, these results also reveal that changes in youth unemployment
have no particular effect on crime.
After the inclusion of a number of additional control variables the results are qualitatively
similar as the estimates in Table 4 show. All social capital indicators have a statistically
significant impact on crime rates. In the extended model, income inequality has no significant
effect on crime and the sign alternates depending on the specification. Previous research
on the effect of income inequality on crime also shows contradicting results (e.g., Soares,
2004). However, recent research shows that changes in the distribution of income inequality
rather than income inequality itself affect property crime (Bourguignon, Nun˜ez, and Sanchez,
2003; Chiu and Madden, 1998). Another point is that the cross-section analysis we employ
throughout the paper may not be such a suitable approach to assess the importance of
inequality and unemployment on crime rates. Unfortunately, in our setting it is not possible
to pursue panel analysis. This is because we do not have the adequate data to do so and
more importantly because social capital is a stock that does not change from year to year,
whereas inequality and unemployment figures do.
As expected the percentage of recreational and shopping area has a positive and signif-
icant effect on crime (e.g., Jobes, 1999). This is because there are more opportunities for
criminals in such areas and the returns are higher (e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). We
also found quite a strong effect for the percentage of coffeeshops in a municipality on crime
rates. This could be due to several reasons. First, the probability of committing crime may
increase under the influence of soft drugs. Second, coffeeshops attract disadvantaged per-
sons, gang activity and drug dealers which sets up an environment that supports criminal
activity. Finally, to buy drugs, addicted people often have to commit crime. Inclusion of the
four control variables increases the explanatory power by one third suggesting that about 65
percent of the variation in crime is explained by the extended model. The added-variable
plots are presented in Figure 2, which reveal the strong conditional correlations except for
trust.
Table 5 is a summary table presenting the coefficients of all social capital indicators we
consider for different subsamples. It is apparent that all six (charity, blood, vote, foreign,
divorce and movers) non-survey social capital indicators have a significant effect on crime.
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The survey indicators, trust, ppltrust, help, fair and trustplc, do not return a significant
coefficient all the time. Another potentially interesting result is the impact of emigration
as well as immigration on crime rates. Immigration has a negative effect because it reduces
closure in a community (e.g., Jobes, 1999). Considering the fact that social capital originates
from social interactions within a network, any factor breaking links between actors is harmful
for social capital. In this respect emigration may also increase crime rates. It could also be
the case that individuals who are less integrated in a society are more likely to commit crime,
which is why both immigration and emigration are positively associated with crime rates.
Our indicator movers (capturing both effects) reflects residential instability in a community
and it is positively related to crime suggesting that the higher instability the higher crime
rates, which is consistent wih earlier work (e.g., Rose and Clear, 1998). The social capital
indices are always significant at the one percent level regardless of the specification and the
sample considered.
5.2 2SLS Estimates
The OLS estimates above could be biased because of causality problems. We next explore
a 2SLS strategy instrumenting social capital with the percentage of foreigners, percentage
of Protestants and the number of schools in 1859. Table 6 presents the 2SLS estimates.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) present the first stages of the 2SLS estimations for the three social
capital indices, respectively. The instruments in the first stage have the expected effect on
social capital. The quality of the instruments is important as they should be correlated with
social capital but not with the error term in a way that the instruments should be on the
‘knife’s edge’. If the correlations of the instruments and social capital are not strong enough
in the first stage we run into weak instrument problems. On the other hand, if they are
too strong we cannot safely assume that they are not correlated with the error term. The
joint F-tests in the first stage show that our instruments are valid as they pass the F-test
threshold of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). Moreover the over-identification tests
show that the effect of the instruments on crime are operationalized only through their effect
on social capital, not by any other mechanism.
The second stage results reveal that the coefficients of the social capital indices are
somewhat larger than their OLS counterparts and significant at the 1 percent level. These
estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in social capital reduces crime by
between 0.30 and 0.34 of a standard deviation. This effect is economically meaningful and
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not far from the estimates from the OLS exercise above (Table 4). The estimates suggest
that the causality runs from social capital to crime and the historical state of a community
shape current social capital.
Complementary to the OLS results above we present summary information on how in-
dividual indicators of social capital behave in 2SLS specification. Table 7 is comparable
to Table 5 and for each subsample and model the first column shows the 2SLS coefficient
derived from the estimation of equation (4) (for the base and the extended model). The
second column shows the associated joint significance test of the instruments in the first
stage. In all specifications the estimations return a significant coefficient in the second stage.
However, the F-tests illustrate an interesting pattern. As can be seen from Table 7 F-tests
for foreign, divorce, vote and charity are larger than (or within the proximity of) 10. Given
this result, we can assert that these indicators cannot only be labeled as good indicators of
social capital, since they are also the ones that display consistent and quite robust estimates
in their relationship with crime. Blood donations do not perform as good as the ones above.
The estimates presented in Tables 4-7 use different measures of social capital and our
social capital indices, which come from treating the concept as a latent construct. In the
theoretical literature on social control, support and networks have been put forward or could
be applied as measures of social capital in relation to crime. In our empirical analysis we
have constructed measures that are by and large consistent with these theoretical concepts.
All measures of social capital turn out to have a significant relationship with crime.
The methodology we employ in this paper allows us to discuss which indicators of social
capital perform best. This is potentially interesting for future research as we can identify
social capital indicators and also their relation to crime. Throughout the paper we have sum-
marized the results for 14 potential social capital indicators and three indices constructed
from these indicators. Indicators related to social support, solidarity and civicness perform
quite well as indicators of social capital. However, electoral turnout and donations to charity
stand out from the rest. Although their relation to crime is mostly significant, blood dona-
tions and trust are found to be rather inferior when compared to charity and vote. This
can be seen from Table A1.2 in Appendix 1. When constructing the indices, the principal
component analysis yields more or less the same weight for charity and vote, but blood and
trust receive only about one third of the weight attached to charity and vote. This discrep-
ancy becomes visible and significant as the sample moves from NUTS3 regions to smaller
municipalities. Our results also show that indicators of social control (divorce rates) and pop-
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ulation heterogeneity (percentage of foreigners, immigration, emigration and movers) can be
labeled as good social capital indicators. When the principal component loadings of the most
inclusive index (SC1) is inspected carefully one can easily see that charity, vote, foreign
and divorce receive similar weights in magnitude. In almost all specifications charity, vote
and most of the measures of social control and heterogeneity are important determinants of
crime. Blood donations and trust indicators from the ESS database are found to be not as
important as the others.
5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 Subsamples
We perform several robustness checks to validate our results. First, we replicate the analysis
using different subsamples. The detailed results of these exercises are presented in Appendix
2 for 95 municipalities with more than 40,000 inhabitants, Appendix 3 for 63 municipalities
over 50,000 inhabitants, Appendix 4 for 40 NUTS 3 regions and finally Appendix 5 for the
22 largest agglomerations in the Netherlands. This exercise reveals that there are no crucial
differences affecting the results discussed above and that our findings do not seem to be
bound to a specific subsample.
5.3.2 Different Types of Crime
Besides analysis on the overall crime rates we also estimate the extended model (equation
3) for 9 different crime categories. The rationale behind this is the argument that overall
crime rates are biased due to under reporting of certain crime types. Therefore, we have
to show that our results also hold for crime that is supposed to have minimum reporting
inconsistencies such as auto theft, robbery, serious assaults and homicide. Table 8 presents
the expected sign and the significance levels of the impact of different social capital indicators
on crime subcategories and Figure 3 depicts the added-variable plots. The results highlight
several interesting points. With the exception of the social capital indices, the individual
social capital indicators seem to have a weak effect on homicide only. Four indicators yield
significant coefficients. The only subcategory of crime that is found to be affected by all
social capital indicators is serious assaults. The difference in the effect of social capital on
property and violent crimes is also not that important. The only exception to this is that
trust and divorce seem to have more effect on violent crimes when compared to property
crimes. Another interesting result is that charity, vote and foreign have a significant impact
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on almost all of the crime categories besides their effect on overall crime rates. The other
indicators are sometimes loosely related to crime rates. This point could also be taken as a
point for caution for researchers who employ a single (or few) social capital indicator, as the
results would highly depend on the selection of that particular indicator.
5.3.3 Social Capital Indicators
One of our main arguments in this paper is that the indicators seemingly unrelated are in
fact correlated with each other and represent different dimensions of social capital. Previous
research argues that blood donations and electoral turnout can safely be considered to be
exogenous (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004). By the same token, one could argue
that divorce rates are exogenous too. However, it could be the case that because of higher
crime municipalities become more transient and heterogeneous as opportunities attract out-
siders or it could be the case that because of high crime residents are afraid to leave their
homes which affects their civic participation and reduces interpersonal trust (e.g., Liska and
Warner, 1991). As a further robustness check we show what happens if one employs indica-
tors of social capital as instruments for each other. Figure 4 summarizes the results. The
upper and the lower panel represent the 2SLS coefficients and the t-ratios respectively. To
make our point clear we can explain the methodology as following. We instrument each
social capital indicator by the remaining five social capital indicators and estimate 2SLS
models. For instance, for the first box-plot in the upper panel, we use all possible combina-
tions of blood, vote, trust, foreign and divorce − individually, and in groups of 2, 3, 4 and
5 − as instruments to charity and replicate the 2SLS estimation over and over again until
we consume all possible combinations. This produces a set of 2SLS coefficients and t-ratios
for charity and the distribution of these coefficients and t-ratios are depicted as the first
box-plot in the upper and lower panel respectively. This is done for all six indicators and
for each case there are 31 observations (i.e., 31 2SLS coefficients and t-ratios for each social
capital indicator). The (*) indicates the coefficients and the t-ratios of the social capital
indicators from the OLS estimation of equation 3 (see Table 4). The three vertical lines in
the lower panel indicate the significance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
From Figure 4, the following observations stand out. First, as can be seen from the lower
panel, all the 2SLS coefficients are significant at least at the 5 percent level. This supports our
argument that all these indicators are related to each other and could be used as instruments
for each other. Including them in the same regression would render serious multicollinearity
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problems. It was specifically for this reason that we formed social capital indices. Second,
the 2SLS coefficients and t-ratios are somewhat higher than their OLS counterparts. Third,
the 2SLS coefficient of trust varies to a large extent but this is expected as trust figures
are adjusted to be used at the municipality level as explained in Section 3.1. As a further
robustness check we estimate the 2SLS model by instrumenting social capital with the three
instruments including them individually rather than as a group to see their individual effect
on social capital in the first stage. The summary results are provided in Table 7. One
can easily see that the percentage of Protestants in 1859 is a powerful instrument for social
capital. Population heterogeneity and number of schools in 1859 do not perform as well as
religiosity when used as instruments individually.
5.3.4 Differences in Income
Fourth, we consider including income measures to the extended model. It might be the case
that income levels rather than income inequality explain variation in crime. Five different
indicators of income are included separately in the regression to assess the responsiveness of
the coefficients of three social capital indices. These are, (i) income p: income per person (no
distinction between full time and part-time employment), (ii) income t: income per person
(of those who work 52 weeks a year), (iii) income w: income per person of western origin (of
those who work 52 weeks a year), (iv) income nw: income per person of non-western origin
(of those who work 52 weeks a year), and (v) income gap: income w / income nw. Figure
5 displays summary results of this exercise. Original standardized coefficients are compared
to coefficients resulting from five different estimations for three SC indices. The inclusion
of income indicators does not change the previous findings. Including income per person of
full-time employees and income of non-western foreigners tends to reduce the SC coefficients
slightly.
5.3.5 Population Heterogeneity
Next, crime rates could display variance across ethnic communities. For instance, keeping all
other factors constant assume that there are two communities with similar level of foreigners
residence but one has higher crime. The mix of foreigners might explain this difference.
There might be less crime in municipalities where the majority of foreigners are from Euro-
pean countries. To test this, we differentiate between foreigners of western and non-western
origin and re-estimate the extended model. When comparing different groups standardized
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coefficients could be misleading, so we calculated the actual impact on crime. Presence of
one percent of non-western foreigners is associated with 0.18 percent higher crime, whereas
this is only 0.13 for western foreigners. The results are meaningful as on average the foreign
population is about 15 percent of total population. So for instance, presence of 10 percent
non-western foreigners in a municipality accounts for 1.8 percent crime on average.20 One
possibly expects this trend to persist for different crime categories. Figure 6 depicts the effect
of the presence of non-western and western foreigners, with the original effect for different
crime types.21 As can be seen from the graph this is not exactly true. Only in the case of
theft and robbery presence of non-western foreigners is associated with higher crime. There
are negligible differences between non-western and western foreigners for other categories of
crime.
Our strategy incorporates heterogeneity and divorce rates in a social capital index, so in
a way we argue that these indicators affect outcomes through social capital. However, most
empirical crime models assess the effect of these variables individually. For this reason, we
estimated the extended model by OLS and 2SLS by including divorce, foreign and SC3
index in the same equation. The results are summarized in Table 10, rows (3) and (4). The
first two rows present the coefficients from the original estimations. The presence of social
capital still seems to be an important indicator even after including divorce and foreign
as independent variables. The effect of SC3 reduces considerably but this does not change
our conclusions. Rows (5) to (7) display summary results for the estimations when three
instruments are included as independent variables. Our empirical strategy rests on the as-
sumption that the exogenous variation in social capital depends on historical instruments.
The 2SLS estimations only take this exogenous variation into account, which in a way as-
sumes that historical instruments are the only indicators that matters. This is of course not
true. One way to deal with this problem is to run OLS estimations controlling for historical
instruments (e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2007). Comparing rows (5) to (7) with
the first two rows it can be observed that the results change slightly. Moreover, the findings
also reinforce the quality of the instruments as it is clear that the instruments do not have
impact on current crime levels.
Finally, as a further robustness check, we omitted the most influential observations using
two criteria: Cook’s D and Df Betas. For each criterion we first omitted the most influ-
20On average the overall crime rate is about 5 percent, so 10 percent of non-western foreign population
accounts for about 30 percent of overall crime
21Murder and rape are omitted from the graph as the effects are very small and the differences between
western and non-western foreigners are minor.
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ential observation and then the first five most influential observations and re-estimated the
extended model. Figure 10, rows (8) to (15) summarize the results of these estimations. The
coefficients of the three social capital indices remain significant at the 1 percent level.
6 Conclusion
From a community governance perspective, communities play an important role in crime
prevention by providing informal social control, support and networks. As Dilulio (1996)
puts it, the presence of social capital provides community-oriented solutions to the crime
problem and these solutions are more important than increasing expenditure on police or
incarceration.
Our estimates suggest that communities/cities with higher levels of social capital have
lower crime rates. We have shown that these estimates are robust and have examined
carefully the causality of this relationship. Generally, a one standard deviation increase in
social capital reduces crime by roughly around 0.30 of a standard deviation. These estimates
contribute to finding an explanation for why crime is heterogeneous across space.
We have used institutional development in the past to proxy for current social capital.
Hence, we treat social capital as a long-term phenomenon, which stock has been build during
a long period of time. From a policy perspective, this makes our study difficult to apply
because our measures of social capital cannot be changed rapidly but need long-term invest-
ment. On the positive side, we show that crime is higher in municipalities where more youth
is present. Informal education in the early stages of the life cycle provided by the family
and community control and support could act as an important mechanism to reduce youth
crime and later on build networks.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants (n=142)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
density 1369.31 1231.36 95.00 5511.00
charity 6.38 3.18 0.73 19.06
blood 2.69 1.67 0.21 14.41
vote 80.49 4.59 67.70 91.20
divorce 5.31 1.68 0.55 9.96
trust 5.77 0.25 5.30 6.20
ppltrust 5.76 0.31 5.13 6.32
help 5.32 0.29 4.79 5.91
fair 6.22 0.27 5.75 6.76
trustplc 5.89 0.19 5.23 6.41
foreign 16.30 7.30 4.61 45.39
immig 0.72 0.38 0.17 2.59
emmig 0.37 0.21 0.12 1.31
movers 1.09 0.55 0.31 3.78
SC1 0.00 1.80 -5.27 3.92
SC2 0.00 1.40 -3.50 3.70
SC3 0.00 1.32 -2.98 3.43
protestant1859 54.95 33.19 0.02 99.77
foreign1859 2.07 2.16 0.00 12.94
#school1859 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.18
crime 4.99 2.49 1.60 14.53
homicide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
assault 0.58 0.30 0.13 2.01
rape 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
robbery 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.55
theft 1.23 0.74 0.23 5.31
autotheft 1.47 1.03 0.20 7.64
burglary 0.55 0.24 0.13 1.29
domestic burglary 0.47 0.21 0.05 1.09
drug 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.18
young 18.81 3.23 9.96 32.47
inequality 0.90 0.45 0.23 2.56
unemp 1.60 2.66 0.00 16.84
education 51.72 7.55 34.76 71.34
cofshop 0.35 0.45 0.00 3.67
shop 21.61 7.69 7.34 49.53
recrat 27.08 8.72 13.45 66.53
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Table 6: 2SLS results for crime and social capital for municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants
(1) 1st stage (2) 2SLS (3) 1st stage (4) 2SLS (5) 1st stage (6) 2SLS
SC1 crime SC2 crime SC3 crime
density -0.841 0.089 -0.511 0.167 -0.524 0.162
(0.133)*** (0.086) (0.111)*** (0.072)** (0.098)*** (0.074)**
education 0.294 -0.013 0.314 0.003 0.230 -0.025
(0.091)*** (0.048) (0.077)*** (0.057) (0.073)*** (0.053)
unemp -0.085 -0.048 -0.129 -0.065 -0.059 -0.039
(0.060) (0.035) (0.063)** (0.036)* (0.048) (0.035)
young 0.134 0.128 0.279 0.182 0.167 0.149
(0.127) (0.089) (0.099)*** (0.091)** (0.093)* (0.086)*
inequality 0.318 0.063 0.314 0.069 0.301 0.062
(0.104)*** (0.061) (0.099)*** (0.063) (0.080)*** (0.062)
shop 0.024 0.148 0.121 0.180 0.030 0.146
(0.095) (0.051)*** (0.097) (0.056)*** (0.076) (0.053)***
recrat -0.026 0.129 -0.001 0.135 0.045 0.149
(0.111) (0.056)** (0.081) (0.063)** (0.072) (0.061)**
cofshop -0.330 0.179 -0.130 0.235 -0.188 0.217
(0.097)*** (0.062)*** (0.077)* (0.062)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)***
foreign1859 -0.366 -0.309 -0.237
(0.090)*** (0.085)*** (0.066)***
protestant1859 0.315 0.321 0.396
(0.086)*** (0.087)*** (0.067)***
#school1859 0.185 0.172 0.106
(0.093)** (0.082)** (0.079)
SC1 -0.295
(0.076)***
SC2 -0.328
(0.081)***
SC3 -0.341
(0.081)***
Constant 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014
(0.088) (0.046) (0.080) (0.048) (0.069) (0.047)
n 142 142 142 142 142 142
Adj R sqr 0.66 0.68 0.53 0.64 0.61 0.66
R-squared 0.69 0.57 0.64
F-test instrm. 16.18*** 17.43*** 25.16***
overid 4.14 (0.11) 3.28 (0.19) 2.11 (0.34)
Dependent variable is the overall crime rate. All variables are standardized. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are the first stage results.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
F-test is a test of joint significance of the instruments.
overid is a test of over identification. Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.
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Table 8: Different 2SLS specifications for crime and social capital
SC1 SC2 SC3
(1) 1st stage (2) 2SLS (3) 1st stage (4) 2SLS (5) 1st stage (6) 2SLS
SC crime SC crime SC crime
foreign1859 -0.472 -0.145 -0.418 -0.164 -0.378 -0.182
(0.098)*** (0.102) (0.088)*** (0.115) (0.075)*** (0.128)
F-test instrm. 23.01*** 22.59*** 25.26***
protestant1859 0.450 -0.407 0.436 -0.419 0.481 -0.380
(0.084)*** (0.102)*** (0.081)*** (0.112)*** (0.062)*** (0.093)***
F-test instrm. 28.63*** 28.74*** 60.40***
#school1859 0.216 -0.467 0.207 -0.486 0.156 -0.646
(0.099)** (0.262)* (0.089)** (0.283)* (0.086)* (0.420)
F-test instrm. 4.76** 5.37** 3.30*
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All coefficients are obtained from the 2SLS model (equation 4) when it is estimated by including the instruments
individually rather than as a group of three.
More detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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A Details on Variable Definitions and Data Sources
A.1 Variable definitions
Table A1.1: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition
young Percentage of people aged 15-24 in 2001. Source: Centraal Bureau voor
de Statistiek (CBS).
density Log of population density in 2001. Source: CBS.
unemp Youth unemployment defined as a percentage of people who are under
age 30 and unemployed in 2001. Source: CBS
education Percentage of people with medium and high levels of education in 2001.
Source: CBS.
inequality Income inequality defined as the difference between the 80th and 20th
percentile of the income distribution in 2001. Source: CBS.
recrat Percentage of total area devoted to recreation in 2001. Source: CBS.
shop Percentage of total area devoted to shopping in 2001. Source: CBS.
cofshop Number of coffeeshops per 10,000 inhabitants in 2002. Source for the
absolute figures: (Bieleman and Nayer, 2005).
charity Voluntary contributions per household in Euros. Average of six years
from 2000-2005. Source: Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving. See Ap-
pendix 1.2 for details.
blood Blood donations per 100 inhabitants in 2005. Source: See Appendix 1.2
for details.
vote Voter turnout in the election of the lower house (Tweede Kamer) in 2003.
Source: CBS.
trust Trust indicator calculated as the average of three indicators: ppltrst, help
and fair. See Appendix 1.1 for details. Source: European Social Survey
(ESS) 2002 and 2004 rounds.
ppltrust Generalized trust indicator constructed from the answers to the question
“Most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful”. See Appendix
1.2 for details. Source: ESS 2002 and 2004 rounds.
help Social capital indicator obtained from the question “Most of the time
people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves”. See Appendix
1.2 for details. Source: ESS 2002 and 2004 rounds.
fair Social capital indicator obtained form the question “Most people try to
take advantage of you, or try to be fair”. See Appendix 1.2 for details.
Source: ESS 2002 and 2004 round
trustplc Confidence in police. See Appendix 1.2 for details. Source: ESS 2002
and 2004 rounds.
SC1 First principal component of six social capital indicators: charity, blood,
vote, trust, foreign and divorce. See Appendix 1.2 for details.
Note: If otherwise indicated all variables are averages of years 2000, 2001 and 2002.
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Variable Definition
SC2 First principal component of four social capital indicators: charity,
blood, vote and trust. See Appendix 1.2 for details.
SC3 First principal component of three social capital indicators: charity,
blood and vote. See Appendix 1.2 for details.
divorce Percentage of divorces in the total population. Source: CBS.
immig Immigration as a percentage of the total population. Source: CBS.
emmig Emigration as a percentage of the total population. Source: CBS.
movers Sum of immigration and emigration as a percentage of the total popu-
lation. Source: CBS.
foreign Percentage of foreigners in the total population. Source: CBS.
foreign1859 Percentage of foreigners in the total population in 1859. See Appendix
1.3 for details. Source: Volkstellingen Archief.
protestant1859 Percentage of Protestants in the total population in 1859. See Appendix
1.3 for details. Source: Volkstellingen Archief.
#school1859 Number of schools per 100 inhabitants in 1859. See Appendix 1.3 for
details. Source: Volkstellingen Archief.
crime Crime rates including all recorded crimes in 2002. See Appendix 1.4 for
detailed information on crime data and how crime categories are formed.
homicide Homicide per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
assault Assault per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
rape Rape per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
robbery Robbery per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
theft Theft per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
autotheft Motor vehicle theft per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
burglary Burglary per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
domestic burglary Domestic burglary per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
drug Crime related to hard drugs per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
Note: If otherwise indicated all variables are averages of years 2000, 2001 and 2002.
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A.2 Social capital indicators
We have benefited from four social capital indicators. First, we used voluntary contributions per
household as an indicator of altruism. The data is available from Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving via
[http://www.cbf.nl//Database goede doelen/2 Collectegegevens Gemeenten.php] at the municipality level
from 2000 to 2005. However in order to minimize the risk of high variability from year to year and
because of missing values for some municipalities for different years we took the average of the avail-
able data for each municipality.
Second, as a measure of civic participation we used the voter turnout of the elections for the Lower
House (Tweede Kamer) in 2003. This data is available at the municipality level via Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek (CBS) website at [http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/cijfers/statline/toegang/default.htm]
and is calculated as the number of votes divided by the number of inhabitants eligible to vote multi-
plied by 100.
Our next indicator, blood donations, could also be viewed as an indicator of altruism. We col-
lected data number of blood donations at the municipality level. The data is recorded under two
different headings: blood donations to blood centers and hospitals, and blood donations to the mobile
centers. Not every municipality in the Netherlands has a blood bank and/or a hospital and some of
these municipalities are frequently visited by mobile services. However there are some municipalities
that do not have blood centers and have not been visited by mobile blood centers. Therefore, we have
made the following correction. If there is no record for a municipality we assume that the inhabitants
of the municipality donate blood in the closest municipality in the neighborhood. However, in all
cases there is more than one neighbor municipality in which the inhabitants can possibly donate
blood. In such cases we divided the population of that municipality by the number of neighbors
and recorded the inhabitants of that municipality to other neighbor municipalities as if they reside
there. Once we have replicated this for all the municipalities that we do not have a record for, we
end up with a base population for all the municipalities in our data set. Then we divide the number
of blood donations by the base population to calculate the blood donations per 100 inhabitants for
each municipality. Finally, for all the municipalities that we do not have a record for, we took the
average of the neighbor municipalities. Among 63 municipalities with a population over 50,000 only
5 are subject to such a correction and among 142 municipalities that has a population over 30,000,
31 are subject to this correction. For NUTS 3 aggregation there is no significant difference between
the corrected and non-corrected blood donation data suggested by the simple correlation coefficient
of 0.89 (significant at the 1 percent level). However for reasons of symmetry with our analysis at the
municipality level we have aggregated the corrected blood donations data at the municipality level
to 40 NUTS3 regions and proceed employing this measure.
Fourth, we used a set of indicators from the European Social Surveys (ESS), carried out in 2002
and 2004. In order to maximize the number of individual data we merged the first and the second
rounds of the data set for Netherlands. The data is available for 40 NUTS 3 regions. We aggregated
the data on individuals (2,364 individuals in the first round and 1,881 individuals in the second round,
a total of 4,245 data points) to 40 regions. The raw data is adjusted by population weights to reduce
the problems that may arise due to oversampling. The questions that we base our indicators on and
the answer categories to these questions are exactly the same in both rounds. We used an equal
weighted average to construct a trust index (trust) from three questions. First, people trust (ppltrst)
is a generalized trust indicator obtained from the answers to the question “Most people can be trusted
or you cannot be too careful”. The answer category ranges from (0) “you can’t be too careful” to
(10) “most people can be trusted”, with nine levels in between. The mean (s.e.) for this indicator
is 5.75 (2.09) for n=4,243. Second, people help (help) is constructed from the question “Most of the
time people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves”. The answer category ranges from (0)
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“people mostly look out for themselves” to (10) “people mostly try to be helpful”, with nine levels in
between. The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 5.30 (1.97) for n=4,242. Third, people fair (fair) is an
indicator obtained from the question “Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair”.
The answer category ranges from (0) “most people would try to take advantage of me” to (10) “most
people would try to be fair”, with nine levels in between. The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 6.20
(1.85) for n=4,233. The mean (s.e.) for the trust index is 5.75 (1.58) for n=4,229. We also used the
question on confidence to police (trustplc) for robustness reasons. The question is “How much you
personally trust in police”. The answer category ranges from (0) “no trust at all” to (10) “complete
trust”. The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 5.89 (1.94) for n=4,213. One particular weakness of
these measures is that they are observed at the regional level and when conducting the analysis at
the municipality level these indicators have the same number for all the municipalities belonging to
the same NUTS3 definition.
In addition to these four indicators, we also used two other indicators − the percentage of di-
vorces and the percentage of foreigners in the total population − as they display high and significant
correlations with the above four indicators. Out of these seemingly unrelated indicators we have
constructed several social capital indices by using principal component analysis (PCA). We first in-
cluded 6 indicators, charity, blood, vote, trust, foreign and divorce, to form an all inclusive measure
and labeled it as SC1. Then we included only four social capital indicators, excluding divorce and
foreign and form SC2 defined as the first principal component of charity, blood, vote and trust.
Finally we constructed a third index out of three indicators, charity, blood and vote, and labeled
it SC3. The reason for this is that trust is measured at the regional level as discussed above and
especially in the analysis at the municipality level this might result in measurement error.
To check the robustness of our indices we constructed all possible combinations of these indices
by interchanging between indicators. For instance, we can use ppltrust, help, fair separately instead
of trust or we can use immig instead of foreign. All constructed indices behave in a similar way. We
also did not include similar indicators in content (for instance, including ppltrust, help or trustplc
at the same time) because PCA tends to give similar weights to these indicators and the resulting
index becomes very powerful (i.e., the probability of obtaining a significant coefficient for the social
capital index in regressions increases considerably).
Table A1.2 below displays information on the principal component loadings of the first princi-
pal component and the explained variance for each social capital index for different samples. As
visible from the table the indicators have positive loadings. On the contrary indicators that are
associated with the absence of social capital have negative loadings as expected. The PCA tends
to put more (and similar in terms of quantity) weight on charity, vote, foreign and divorce and
less weight one blood and trust. One reason for this is that blood and trust involve data corrections
and interpolations. This can be easily seen from the table. For instance loadings to blood decrease
considerably in all three social capital indices as we move to the right of the table (i.e., the number
of corrected/interpolated data points increase as the sample size increases from 40 NUTS3 regions
with no data corrections to 142 municipalities with some data corrections, which seems to reduce
the robustness of the indicator). After all this can be viewed as a positive outcome and it helps to
produce a social capital indicator by specifically placing less weight on some indicators. All indices
are expected to display a negative relationship with crime.
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Table A1.2: Principal component loadings for the first component and the explained variance
NUTS3 regions muncp. pop>50,000 muncp. pop>40,000 muncp. pop>30,000
SC1 SC2 SC3 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC1 SC2 SC3
charity 0.42 0.49 0.58 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.47 0.55 0.66 0.49 0.59 0.69
blood 0.32 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.40 0.46 0.17 0.34 0.36 0.10 0.25 0.22
vote 0.47 0.58 0.65 0.47 0.57 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.66 0.49 0.63 0.69
trust 0.28 0.46 0.30 0.47 0.31 0.50 0.21 0.44
foreign -0.48 -0.47 -0.48 -0.50
divorce -0.44 -0.41 -0.43 -0.47
explained variance 0.56 0.57 0.65 0.55 0.56 0.63 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.58
n 40 40 40 63 63 63 95 95 95 142 142 142
A.3 Crime data
Crime data is available at the municipality level at http://www.ad.nl/misdaadmeter/. We collected
data on 27 different types of crime. However, due to well-known problems with the data for certain
crime types (under-reporting and reliability), we construct different subgroups according to he 2006
European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice. All crime numbers are calculated as per 100
inhabitants. Throughout our investigation we employ the following subcategories.
Table A1.3.1: Definitions of subgroups of crime
Indicator Definition
crime Crime rates including all 27 categories.
homicide Homicide.
rape Rape.
assault It is defined as the activity of intentionally causing bodily injury to
another person. We include sexual assault, threatening, armed-attack,
mis-treat and act on person, and mugging.
theft Includes auto theft, motor/scooter theft, theft from any kind of business
(office, shop, school, sport complex), and pickpocketing.
autotheft Theft of a motor vehicle excluding handling/receiving stolen vehicles.
We include auto theft, motor/scooter theft, theft of motor vehicles.
robbery The general definition is stealing from a person with force or threat.
This includes robbery and mugging.
burglary Includes theft from any kind of business.
domestic burglary Domestic burglary is defined as gaining access to private premises with
the intent to steal goods. This subcategory excludes theft from a busi-
ness.
drug Hard-drug trading. We did not include soft-drug trading as soft-drugs
use (not trading) is legal in the Netherlands. This may affect the figures
for soft-drugs related crime and its reporting.
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Table A1.3.2: Distribution of criminal activity for different samples
large city pop>50,000 pop>40,000 pop>30,000
crime 52.57 70.41 77.04 83.19
homicide 50.84 66.48 74.30 84.36
rape 49.44 67.89 75.09 81.35
assault 51.91 70.86 77.50 83.49
robbery 76.82 90.13 93.26 94.97
theft 54.30 71.37 77.93 83.98
autotheft 55.99 71.30 77.82 83.85
burglary 43.58 64.21 72.16 79.17
domestic burglary 45.13 64.13 71.49 78.49
drug 75.98 84.69 87.26 90.19
n 22 63 95 142
A.4 Historical data
The major source of the historical data we used is the Volkstellingen Archief (Dutch census), which
is an invaluable data source comprising basic population and household data starting from 1795
onwards. We collected information for 1859 which was the first round presenting data at the mu-
nicipality level. This year has a particular municipality definition presenting data on about 1,200
local area units. Therefore, we had to come up with a correspondence table matching the local area
names in 1859 to current municipality definitions. In doing this we benefited from (i) information
on the historical evolution of the municipality definitions, (ii) correspondence tables linking each
current local area unit (about 6,000 places regardless of size that are smaller than a municipality)
in the Netherlands to a municipality definition in 2002, and (iii) historical maps as we encountered
problems in matching about 10 local area units to a municipality. The main reason for this is that
the statistics were recorded in historical names that do not necessarily exist anymore in the current
correspondence tables. For these local area units we use historical maps and match the historical
local area name to a current local area name and then to a corresponding municipality. Information
on the first two is available from Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
First, we have collected data on the percentage of foreigners in a local area unit in 1859. We
define foreign1859 as the number of foreigners per inhabitant multiplied by 100. Then we gathered
information on the percentage of Protestants in a municipality in 1859. The names and the data
availability for different Churches and Protestant groups (most of which are smaller denominations
and most of the time constitute less than 0.01 percent of the total population) differ in great extent
from the current classifications. Therefore, we summed up all inhabitants belonging to a Protestant
denomination, divided by the total number of inhabitants living in the municipality and multiplied
by 100 to arrive at our indicator protestant1859. Finally, we gathered data on the number of houses
and schools per local area unit in 1859. We define #school1859 as the number of schools per 100
inhabitants and view it as a proxy to education in 1859. One particular problem with the historical
data is that some current municipalities were gained from the North Sea: Noordoostpolder in 1944,
Oostelijk Flevoland in 1957 and Zuidelijk Flevoland in 1966. Obviously, we do not have information
for these regions before these dates, and we used figures from the 1971 census as a substitute for
earlier years. Only four municipalities are subject to this correction are, Almere (code 476), Dronten
(381), Lelystad (439), and Noordoostpolder (411).
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B Results for municipalities larger than 40,000 inhabitants
The results below are replications of the analysis, tables and graphs for 95 municipalities with more
than 40,000 inhabitants (except for Table 5). We provide these results and the results in the following
appendices for robustness reasons to show that our findings prevail for different samples of munici-
palities and different regional definitions.
Table A2.1: Summary statistics (n=95)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
density 1626.83 1278.82 96.00 5511.00
charity 5.39 2.57 0.73 13.43
blood 2.84 1.89 0.21 14.41
vote 79.31 4.56 67.70 88.90
divorce 5.75 1.64 0.64 9.96
trust 5.76 0.25 5.30 6.20
ppltrust 5.77 0.30 5.13 6.32
help 5.30 0.28 4.79 5.91
fair 6.22 0.27 5.75 6.76
trustplc 5.89 0.20 5.23 6.41
foreign 18.42 7.37 5.76 45.39
immig 0.76 0.36 0.17 1.96
emmig 0.40 0.22 0.14 1.31
movers 1.16 0.53 0.38 3.27
SC1 -0.54 1.73 -5.27 3.51
SC2 -0.32 1.39 -3.50 3.70
SC3 -0.37 1.22 -2.98 3.30
protestant1859 54.77 32.07 0.02 99.77
foreign1859 2.27 2.20 0.00 12.94
#school1859 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.18
crime 5.66 2.64 1.65 14.53
homicide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
assault 0.66 0.32 0.21 2.01
rape 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
robbery 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.55
theft 1.41 0.67 0.39 4.30
autotheft 1.66 1.12 0.20 7.64
burglary 0.62 0.24 0.18 1.29
domestic burglary 0.52 0.22 0.05 1.09
drug 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.18
young 19.43 3.20 9.96 32.47
inequality 0.82 0.41 0.23 2.12
unemp 1.88 2.70 0.00 16.84
education 52.44 7.46 34.76 71.34
cofshop 0.44 0.49 0.00 3.67
shop 23.59 6.60 8.73 43.23
recrat 27.09 7.43 13.67 56.93
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Table A2.5: 2SLS results for crime and social capital for municipalities with more than 40,000 inhabitants
(1) 1st stage (2) 2SLS (3) 1st stage (4) 2SLS (5) 1st stage (6) 2SLS
SC1 crime SC2 crime SC3 crime
density -0.690 0.104 -0.439 0.155 -0.447 0.138
(0.146)*** (0.086) (0.125)*** (0.078)** (0.116)*** (0.084)*
education 0.493 -0.108 0.447 -0.093 0.372 -0.099
(0.134)*** (0.075) (0.128)*** (0.078) (0.101)*** (0.072)
unemp -0.210 -0.073 -0.260 -0.100 -0.132 -0.060
(0.143) (0.057) (0.101)** (0.055)* (0.088) (0.050)
young 0.180 0.168 0.328 0.238 0.244 0.225
(0.163) (0.110) (0.117)*** (0.107)** (0.118)** (0.107)**
inequality 0.293 0.108 0.301 0.119 0.276 0.118
(0.124)** (0.066) (0.100)*** (0.069)* (0.090)*** (0.066)*
shop 0.057 0.144 0.163 0.177 0.108 0.159
(0.120) (0.052)*** (0.105) (0.056)*** (0.090) (0.055)***
recrat 0.166 0.150 0.149 0.146 0.128 0.141
(0.139) (0.048)*** (0.109) (0.052)*** (0.090) (0.052)***
cofshop -0.219 0.140 -0.037 0.195 -0.098 0.173
(0.146) (0.062)** (0.110) (0.064)*** (0.096) (0.061)***
foreign1859 -0.442 -0.320 -0.250
(0.105)*** (0.116)*** (0.085)***
protestant1859 0.263 0.343 0.365
(0.114)** (0.105)*** (0.082)***
#school1859 0.432 0.350 0.289
(0.109)*** (0.103)*** (0.081)***
SC1 -0.288
(0.073)***
SC2 -0.340
(0.081)***
SC3 -0.383
(0.085)***
Constant 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.022
(0.109) (0.051) (0.099) (0.053) (0.086) (0.052)
n 95 95 95 95 95 95
Adj R sqr 0.66 0.71 0.57 0.69 0.60 0.70
R-squared 0.70 0.62 0.65
F-test instrm. 17.73 17.55 20.88
overid 5.20 (0.07)* 2.44 (0.30) 1.95 (0.38)
Dependent variable is the overall crime rate. All variables are standardized. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are the first stage results.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
F-test is a test of joint significance of the instruments.
overid is a test of over identification. Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.
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Table A2.6: Different 2SLS specifications for crime and social capital
SC1 SC2 SC3
(1) 1st stage (2) 2SLS (3) 1st stage (4) 2SLS (5) 1st stage (6) 2SLS
SC crime SC crime SC crime
foreign1859 -0.547 -0.163 -0.450 -0.198 -0.385 -0.232
(0.117)*** (0.086)* (0.119)*** (0.105)* (0.095)*** (0.116)**
F-test instrm. 21.69*** 14.28*** 16.28***
protestant1859 0.505 -0.443 0.528 -0.423 0.513 -0.436
(0.116)*** (0.108)*** (0.097)*** (0.105)*** (0.077)*** (0.102)***
F-test instrm. 18.96*** 29.15*** 43.58***
#school1859 0.526 -0.317 0.465 -0.359 0.407 -0.410
(0.104)*** (0.104)*** (0.098)*** (0.131)*** (0.079)*** (0.148)***
F-test instrm. 25.38*** 22.48*** 26.35***
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All coefficients are obtained from the 2SLS model (equation 4) when it is estimated by including instruments individually.
rather than as a group of three. F-test stands for the significance of the instrument in the first stage.
Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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C Results for municipalities larger than 50,000 inhabitants
The results below are replications in a similar manner for 63 municipalities with more than 50,000
inhabitants. Since we have only 63 observations, we did not replicate the results for the extended
model and the 2SLS results. The coefficients for different social capital indicators deriving from the
extended model are summarized in Table 5.
Table A3.1: Summary statistics (n=63)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
density 1901.88 1373.94 183.00 5511.00
charity 4.76 2.49 0.73 13.09
blood 3.11 2.19 0.21 14.41
vote 78.35 4.32 68.60 88.90
divorce 6.08 1.61 1.06 9.96
trust 5.76 0.25 5.30 6.20
ppltrust 5.76 0.30 5.13 6.32
help 5.31 0.28 4.79 5.91
fair 6.21 0.27 5.75 6.76
trustplc 5.89 0.20 5.23 6.41
foreign 20.44 7.14 5.76 45.39
immig 0.86 0.37 0.34 1.96
emmig 0.44 0.22 0.18 1.31
movers 1.30 0.55 0.54 3.27
SC1 -0.95 1.66 -5.27 3.51
SC2 -0.54 1.38 -3.50 3.70
SC3 -0.62 1.21 -2.98 3.30
protestant1859 55.42 30.36 1.06 99.77
foreign1859 2.43 1.96 0.00 8.64
#school1859 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.18
crime 6.36 2.82 1.65 14.53
homicide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
assault 0.75 0.33 0.21 2.01
rape 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
robbery 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.55
theft 1.61 0.69 0.39 4.30
autotheft 1.88 1.26 0.20 7.64
burglary 0.67 0.24 0.22 1.29
domestic burglary 0.56 0.23 0.05 1.09
drug 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.18
young 20.10 3.40 9.96 32.47
inequality 0.72 0.36 0.23 1.92
unemp 1.86 2.18 0.00 8.53
education 53.78 7.32 37.72 71.34
cofshop 0.52 0.54 0.00 3.67
shop 25.30 5.81 14.94 43.23
recrat 26.73 6.65 13.67 41.58
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D Results for 40 NUTS 3 regions
To check whether we obtain similar results for a different regional definition rather than municipalities,
we constructed another data set comprising the same indicators for 40 NUTS 3 regions. Detailed
information on the NUTS definition for the Netherlands is available from the Eurostat webpage
[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/home regions en.html]. The table below summarizes the
NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 definitions. Due to the limited number of observations (n=40) we
only provide summary statistics, correlations of social capital indicators and figures that plot the
added value of social capital on crime. The coefficients for different social capital indicators deriving
from the extended model are summarized in Table 5.
NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3 NUTS 1 region NUTS 2 region NUTS 3 region
1 11 111 Noord-Nederland Groningen Oost-Groningen
1 11 112 Noord-Nederland Groningen Delfzijl en omgeving
1 11 113 Noord-Nederland Groningen Overig Groningen
1 12 121 Noord-Nederland Friesland Noord-Friesland
1 12 122 Noord-Nederland Friesland Zuidwest-Friesland
1 12 123 Noord-Nederland Friesland Zuidoost-Friesland
1 13 131 Noord-Nederland Drenthe Noord-Drenthe
1 13 132 Noord-Nederland Drenthe Zuidoost-Drenthe
1 13 133 Noord-Nederland Drenthe Zuidwest-Drenthe
2 21 211 Oost-Nederland Overijssel Noord-Overijssel
2 21 212 Oost-Nederland Overijssel Zuidwest-Overijssel
2 21 213 Oost-Nederland Overijssel Twente
2 22 221 Oost-Nederland Gelderland Veluwe
2 22 222 Oost-Nederland Gelderland Achterhoek
2 22 223 Oost-Nederland Gelderland Arnhem/Nijmegen
2 22 224 Oost-Nederland Gelderland Zuidwest-Gelderland
2 23 230 Oost-Nederland Flevoland Flevoland
3 31 310 West-Nederland Utrecht Utrecht
3 32 321 West-Nederland Noord-Holland Kop van Noord-Holland
3 32 322 West-Nederland Noord-Holland Alkmaar en omgeving
3 32 323 West-Nederland Noord-Holland IJmond
3 32 324 West-Nederland Noord-Holland Agglomeratie Haarlem
3 32 325 West-Nederland Noord-Holland Zaanstreek
3 32 326 West-Nederland Noord-Holland Groot-Amsterdam
3 32 327 West-Nederland Noord-Holland Het Gooi en Vechtstreek
3 33 331 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Agglomeratie Leiden en Bollenstreek
3 33 332 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Agglomeratie ’s-Gravenhage
3 33 333 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Delft en Westland
3 33 334 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Oost-Zuid-Holland
3 33 335 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Groot-Rijnmond
3 33 332 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Agglomeratie ’s-Gravenhage
3 33 333 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Delft en Westland
3 33 334 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Oost-Zuid-Holland
3 33 335 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Groot-Rijnmond
3 33 336 West-Nederland Zuid-Holland Zuidoost-Zuid-Holland
3 34 341 West-Nederland Zeeland Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen
3 34 342 West-Nederland Zeeland Overig Zeeland
4 41 411 Zuid-Nederland Noord-Brabant West-Noord-Brabant
4 41 412 Zuid-Nederland Noord-Brabant Midden-Noord-Brabant
4 41 413 Zuid-Nederland Noord-Brabant Noordoost-Noord-Brabant
4 41 414 Zuid-Nederland Noord-Brabant Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant
4 42 421 Zuid-Nederland Limburg Noord-Limburg
4 42 422 Zuid-Nederland Limburg Midden-Limburg
4 42 423 Zuid-Nederland Limburg Zuid-Limburg
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Table A4.1: Summary statistics (n=40)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
density 654.73 618.01 146.00 3196.00
charity 2.43 0.76 0.98 4.85
blood 2.37 1.28 0.89 6.68
vote 80.88 3.19 74.35 85.55
divorce 5.21 1.14 3.74 8.63
trust 5.81 0.24 5.30 6.20
ppltrust 5.79 0.31 5.13 6.32
help 5.35 0.32 4.79 5.91
fair 6.26 0.25 5.75 6.76
trustplc 5.88 0.25 5.12 6.41
foreign 15.25 6.50 7.45 35.36
immig 0.76 0.24 0.42 1.49
emmig 0.47 0.19 0.25 0.95
movers 1.08 0.56 0.45 3.37
SC1 0.00 1.84 -4.77 2.90
SC2 0.00 1.51 -3.04 2.69
SC3 0.00 1.39 -2.56 2.82
protestant1859 61.92 30.19 0.89 99.93
foreign1859 1.92 1.90 0.00 8.83
#school1859 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.15
crime 4.56 1.90 2.35 10.75
homicide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
assault 0.54 0.22 0.30 1.43
rape 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
robbery 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.34
theft 1.13 0.49 0.52 3.14
autotheft 1.29 0.67 0.30 3.00
burglary 0.50 0.16 0.20 1.04
domestic burglary 0.43 0.17 0.20 0.82
drug 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11
young 18.85 1.80 15.76 24.38
inequality 0.78 0.27 0.34 1.39
unemp 1.2 0.90 0.00 3.2
education 50.55 5.60 39.09 61.15
cofshop 0.36 0.35 0.03 2.33
shop 20.02 3.10 12.81 28.91
recrat 28.24 5.24 17.22 38.60
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E Results for 22 large agglomerations
Finally, we also performed analysis at the city level. In the Netherlands there are 22 large agglom-
erations as stated by the CBS. These are Groningen (GRN), Leeuwarden (LEUW), Zwolle (ZWL),
Enschede (ENS), Apeldoorn (APD), Arnhem (ARN), Nijmegen (NIJM), Amersfoort (AMERSF),
Utrecht (UTR), Amsterdam (AMST), Haarlem (HRLM), Leiden (LEID), ’s-Gravenhage (DHG),
Rotterdam (ROTD), Dordrecht (DRDR), Breda (BRD), Tilburg (TLB), ’s-Hertogenbosch (SHRT),
Eindhoven (EIND), Geleen/Sittard (SITT), Heerlen (HERL) and Maastricht (MAST). We provide
the summary statistics, correlation table between social capital indicators, and added-variable plots.
Since we have only 22 observations we can not provide detailed analysis and the added-variable plots
are based on OLS regressions of crime on a constant, populations density and social capital.
Table A5.1: Summary statistics (n=22)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
density 2311.56 1498.66 455.00 5511.00
charity 3.59 2.54 0.73 12.98
blood 3.82 3.30 0.54 14.41
vote 76.04 4.18 68.60 82.90
divorce 6.76 1.73 1.62 9.96
trust 5.75 0.25 5.30 6.15
ppltrust 5.80 0.31 5.23 6.32
help 5.24 0.26 4.81 5.66
fair 6.20 0.26 5.75 6.56
trustplc 5.94 0.20 5.57 6.41
foreign 24.08 8.64 13.71 45.39
immig 1.07 0.38 0.51 1.82
emmig 0.56 0.23 0.24 1.26
movers 1.62 0.54 0.75 2.74
SC1 -1.79 1.81 -5.27 2.25
SC2 -0.99 1.63 -3.50 3.70
SC3 -1.13 1.40 -2.98 3.30
protestant1859 47.01 31.45 1.06 86.81
foreign1859 2.95 1.82 0.85 8.37
#school1859 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08
crime 8.81 2.96 4.02 14.53
homicide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
assault 0.99 0.40 0.34 2.01
rape 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
robbery 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.55
theft 2.23 0.72 1.20 4.30
autotheft 2.96 1.39 1.10 7.64
burglary 0.81 0.22 0.52 1.29
domestic burglary 0.72 0.25 0.05 1.09
drug 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.18
young 22.03 4.29 10.47 32.47
inequality 0.52 0.23 0.23 1.11
unemp 2.45 2.35 0.00 7.93
education 57.05 6.36 44.27 70.21
cofshop 0.94 0.68 0.32 3.67
shop 27.88 5.61 17.73 39.76
recrat 30.91 6.53 19.37 41.58
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